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Gary Horlick: Horlick began by critiquing conventional arguments in favor of antidump-
ing (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws (collectively "unfair trade laws"). These ar-
guments suggest the unfair trade laws are needed as a "safety valve" from import compe-
tition. He noted that World Trade Organization (WTO) rules already include a separate
safety valve-the safeguard rules. The AD and CVD laws are not meant to serve as safety
valves.
In terms of the negotiations on the unfair trade laws during the Doha Round of WTO
negotiations Horlick argued that the issue should be viewed from a negotiating lens and
not as a matter of principle. In Horlick's view, the position of some groups that the United
States must not agree to alter any of the current AD/CVD rules in the Doha Round is not
compatible with the nature of negotiation. The answer to the question-should the United
States be prepared to discuss changes to the AD/CVD rules in the Doha Round-is that it
depends on what the United States is offered. If, for example, the European Union (EU)
were to agree to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or Japan was willing to
cut its tariff on beef by 50 percent in exchange for reforms in the AD/CVD area, Horlick
argued that the United States would find it difficult to refuse to negotiate.
Horlick added that limits imposed on U.S. exports due to AD/CVD duties justify re-
negotiation of the AD/CVD rules in any case. The United States is currently the number
three target of AD duties in the world. Therefore, the prospect of AD/CVD rules being
used as export restraints on U.S. goods is not a risk but a reality.
He stated that unless the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) can guarantee that foreign
countries will be more lenient than the United States is with its AD laws, U.S. producers
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will be at a disadvantage. He observed that this is ultimately unlikely, since the United
States and Canada are the only countries that have independent bodies acting as AD au-
thorities. In the rest of the world, AD/CVD agencies report to a politically appointed
minister. Therefore, whereas foreign producers know they will get an independent decision
on the merits in an AD case in the United States, U.S. producers are far less likely to be
treated fairly.
Horlick argued that this is a key reason why the United States should oppose a special
standard of review in antidumping rules, requiring WTO dispute settlement panels to defer
to national authorities. Foreign courts are far more deferential to the AD/CVD adminis-
tering agencies than are courts in the United States. Thus, it is unwise for USTR to con-
tinue to advocate greater deference by WTO dispute settlement panels to national AD/
CVD authorities. Whereas a foreign exporter involved in a trade case in the United States
will get a searching decision on the merits at the national level of its antidumping and
countervailing duty claims, U.S. exporters can only rely on WTO review for a fair reso-
lution of antidumping and countervailing duty their claims. Notwithstanding this fact,
USTR refuses to bring cases at the WTO against foreign countries for improper application
of their trade laws.
Terence Stewart: Stewart first addressed the question of whether antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws should be negotiated in the current round. He acknowledged that
negotiations on the subject are a reality, but stressed the importance of adhering to the
parameters set out in the language of paragraph twenty-eight of the WTO Doha Ministerial
Declaration, which stresses the importance of retaining the effectiveness of the current
agreements. Provided that negotiations comport with this language, he argued, they are a
rational thing for the United States to engage in.
Stewart added that, from the perspective of U.S. petitioners, the United States has an
incentive to negotiate because WTO dispute settlement panels have changed the interpre-
tation and application of the WTO's agreements dealing with AD and CVD laws. Regard-
less of whether recent WTO decisions are good or bad from a policy perspective, he argued,
the decisions do not comport with how the United States understood its obligations under
the WTO agreements. Therefore, additional negotiations may be necessary to ensure that
future VWTO dispute settlement panels adhere more closely to the language and spirit of
the agreements as understood by the parties involved.
Stewart noted that while some domestic petitioners fought to prevent AD and CVD laws
from being discussed at all, a negotiation could be favorable to the United States if the
parameters set in the Doha Ministerial Declaration and in the Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA) legislation are followed. Stewart expressed concern, however, that U.S. trading part-
ners will not respect the limits identified in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. He noted,
however, the value of a more detailed agreement that better reflects what U.S. law is and
thereby limits the creativity of Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) Panels.
\Vith regard to whether the agreements should be restructured to better protect U.S.
exporters facing trade cases abroad, Stewart disagreed with Horlick. He noted that a U.S.
exporter being subject to trade cases in foreign countries is not a new phenomenon. While
the United States may rank third as a target of AD and CVD cases, he noted that, as a
percentage of trade, U.S. exports subject to antidumping orders are smaller than those for
any other country. He further noted that the United States only ranks third in the number
of cases it is defending against if one does not aggregate the EU countries. In sum, with
just fourteen cases lodged against the United States per year, the claim that the rules do
not work in the United States' favor is not persuasive.
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Stewart argued that during the Doha negotiations the United States should focus on
promoting greater transparency and due process and on addressing the underlying causes
of antidumping and countervailing duty cases, which include sheltered home markets and
subsidies. He noted that addressing the fundamental problems in the industries that bring
the vast majority of trade cases, such as by addressing the overcapacity problem in the steel
industry, would be a useful step forward.
Greg Mastel: Mastel focused his remarks on the political importance of U.S. trade laws,
making three observations. First, Mastel stated that trade laws play an indispensable part
in trade liberalization. Their influence is particularly the case now that Congress is so
ambivalent toward trade, as evidenced by the very close battle over Trade Promotion Au-
thority (TPA). Mastel noted that voting records in Congress suggest that sentiment in favor
of trade laws, which has always been strong, is rising. The so-called Dayton-Craig amend-
ment to the TPA bill, which effectively would have prevented discussion of unfair trade
laws in the current Doha Round, garnered over sixty-five votes in the Senate. He observed
that Congress by and large is not interested in the WTO or NAFTA in the abstract; rather,
congressional members care about sectoral issues that affect their constituencies. He
stressed that the problems in these sectors require solutions and, in the short run, often the
only solution is bringing a case under the unfair trade laws.
Second, Mastel noted that conflict between domestic trade laws and the WTO is rising.
He argued that in a few decisions where panels went well beyond their mandate (such as
cases involving U.S. antidumping duties on hot-rolled steel from Japan and countervailing
duties on lumber from Canada), they ended up undermining their own legitimacy. The
V/TO is a negotiated agreement; therefore, it is very dangerous politically for panels to
exceed the scope of the agreement. This danger, he argued, is why the U.S. government
has stressed the need for IA/TO panels to respect the special standard of review applicable
to reviews involving duties against unfair trade.
The WTO's authority is further threatened because several cases adverse to U.S. trade
remedy laws, such as the case involving the so-called Byrd Amendment and the case arising
from the hot-rolled steel antidumping investigation require congressional action for im-
plementation. Because congressional members do not believe that, for example, the Byrd
Amendment violates WTO rules, they may not act on the WTO decision, thus giving rise
to further conflict between Congress and the WTO.
Third, Mastel argued that the increasing conflict between the \ATO agreements and
domestic trade remedy laws will ultimately be resolved in favor of strong antidumping laws.
The Senate strongly supports U.S. trade laws. In any conflict between these laws and small
trade agreements, as well as major agreements such as the VINO, supporters of free trade
are no longer protected from a more fundamental debate on the value of the WTO agree-
ments. This debate is a relatively new phenomenon and raises the question of whether the
WTO agreement itself is a good thing. While further negotiations in the WTO could lead
to many improvements that are positive, Mastel did not see this as their likely outcome.
He stressed that major changes in the AD laws made in 1994 will take many years to digest.
While trade remedy laws in other countries create some problems for U.S. exporters, Mastel
indicated that he found no case where the current INTO rules were inadequate to address
them.
Angela Ellard: Ellard observed that while one year ago the hottest issues in the TPA
debate would have been labor and environment, the toughest issue in conference turned
out to be on trade remedies-the so-called Dayton-Craig amendment. This, she stated,
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shows how important these laws are to congressional members. She suggested, however,
that this statement comes with some caveats.
First, it is important to realize that the apparently strong support for the Dayton-Craig
amendment was really abstract support for the trade remedy laws. The TPA debate did not
involve consideration of specific changes to the trade laws; implementing legislation has in
the past included specific changes.
Second, TPA was very much an effort at balancing, both within the area of trade remedies
(between petitioner and downstream user interests) and across sectors (between strong trade
remedy laws and concessions in agriculture or services). Trade remedies were viewed as one
part of the puzzle that needed to be balanced with other parts. Ellard observed that whether
negotiators ended up in Doha or congressional members supported TPA and trade remedies
was an issue that the U.S. House of Representatives considered and voted on right before
the Doha Ministerial. A resolution introduced in the House by Representative Phil English
emphasized the importance of preserving the United States' ability to continue to enforce
its trade remedy laws and avoid agreements that undermine these laws. At the same time,
in that resolution, members of Congress also voted to ensure that U.S. exports were not
subject to the abusive use of trade laws by other countries. Ellard argued that this resolution
shows that members of Congress realize there is a need for balance in how the trade remedy
laws are applied.
Third, Ellard noted that the reason supporters of the Dayton-Craig amendment got so
many votes in the Senate was that Congress was sending a message to negotiators to take
this issue seriously. When it was clear that this message was understood, the amendment
was ultimately dropped in conference.
With regard to certain adverse WTO decisions on trade remedies, such as the Byrd
Amendment, Ellard agreed with Mastel that Congress may ultimately not change the law
to comply. Trying to convince congressional members to change the law for the sake of
change itself is difficult. Instead, Congress must be convinced that change is absolutely
necessary as part of U.S. obligations under the WTO. Or, as in the U.S. Foreign Sales
Corporation case (where extreme reluctance to comply exists), four billion dollars in retal-
iatory measures will lead many in Congress to feel pressure to change the underlying law.
In sum, Ellard argued, in each case Congress will look to the pros and cons of making
changes to U.S. law in order to be in compliance with WTO rulings. In some cases they
will conclude that it is worth doing, while in other instances they will not.
Questions and Answers: The panel was asked what sort of commitments or concessions the
United States would need in order to consider the elimination of antidumping altogether
or the weakening of U.S. trade remedies. Horlick noted that in the U.S.-Canada free trade
agreement the issue of how to address trade remedies arose, and the United States ultimately
did agree to accept a special dispute resolution process in exchange for improved investment
rules from Canada. He noted that if, for example, the EU offered to drop the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), the United States would give the EU almost anything. Congress
is a practical institution: it wants antidumping and countervailing duties and safeguards but
also desires no barriers to exporters. USTR must resolve the contradiction between these
interests and will likely not be interested in the language in paragraph twenty-eight of the
Doha resolution when it comes time to making deals.
Mastel agreed with Horlick that Congress has many conflicted thoughts on these issues,
but argued that some goals in the trade bill are more difficult to trade away than others.
Trade remedy laws, he argued, will be very difficult to trade away. The Dayton-Craig
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amendment would have required a special vote to do so, and while that amendment did
not ultimately become law, Mastel argued that the vote did not fully reflect the number of
congressional members who supported the amendment in their hearts.
The panel was asked whether the claim that antidumping and countervailing duty laws
were important to ensure public support for more trade liberalization was mere rhetoric.
Stewart stated that in some of his research he found that government officials in India,
China, and Mexico all stressed the opportunity to use trade remedy laws when discussing
trade liberalization with constituents. Stewart also noted that the use of antidumping laws
by Mexico, for example, allowed it to make commitments that it would not otherwise have
been able to make. This concept, he argued, is not just rhetoric; rather, it is particularly
potent when countries are facing dramatic changes in their domestic economies due to
trade liberalization. If these rules are taken away, opposition to trade negotiations will
increase.
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